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Abstract
During the 1990s Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have experienced rapid in-
creases in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers and received the largest
FDI inﬂow in Central and Eastern Europe. This paper analyzes whether FDI has con-
tributed to the raise in earning inequality via a change in the skill composition of labor
demand in the three countries. While we ﬁnd that in Hungary and the Czech Republic FDI
exerts a positive direct impact on the skill-premium, in none of the countries considered
FDI has worsened wage inequality by favoring labor demand shifts.
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This paper studies empirically the marked increase in the wage diﬀerentials between skilled and
unskilled workers experienced by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic during the transition
process to a market economy.
The question we ask is whether it is possible to explain the pattern of growing wage inequality
in these EU accession countries using arguments based on increasing international integration, as
those advanced ﬁrst for developed and subsequently also for developing countries. In particular,
motivated by the recent huge inﬂow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic, we ask whether foreign capital penetration plays a role in explaining
the pattern of wage inequalities in these countries via an expansion in the relative demand for
skilled labor.
A marked increase in the wage diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled workers has been ex-
perienced during the 1980s and the 1990s in the United States and other industrialized countries.
There is no agreement about the possible explanations of this pattern. Some studies focused on
the skilled-biased technical change (SBTC), caused by the spreading utilization of computers
and other new technologies within the ﬁrms (among others, Berman et al., 1994; Autor et al.,
1998). Others focused on factors linked to increasing international integration. Within this ex-
planation, three main sources of wage inequality have been proposed: ﬁrst, trade in ﬁnal goods
and competition from low-wage countries; second, trade in intermediate inputs; ﬁnally, FDI and
the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The theoretical rationale for expecting an
eﬀect of trade in ﬁnal goods on wage inequality is based on the well-known Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, while the cross-border fragmentation of the production process and the de-locatization
2of stages of production in low-wage countries are expected to act as within-industry demand
shifter toward skilled workers, that is the same eﬀect of skill-biased technical change.1 The role
of FDI and multinationals in explaining raising wage inequality has received speciﬁc attention.
Generally speaking, MNEs are likely to be more skilled labor-intensive than national ﬁrms and
thus relative demand for skilled labor tends to rise as multinationals emerge and substitute
for national enterprises (Markusen and Venables, 1997). Moreover, FDI is a channel through
which fragmentation of production can take place. Firms in the skill labor-abundant (devel-
oped) country are likely to outsource the least skill-intensive activities, raising the skill-intensity
of production and contributing to increase relative demand and relative earnings of the higher
skilled in the home economy (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996).2
The rise in wage inequality was observed not only in developed countries, but also in many
developing economies. This pattern conﬂicts with the neoclassical explanations about the re-
distributive eﬀects of international trade. From a diﬀerent theoretical perspective, Feenstra and
Hanson (1996) focussed on the role played by foreign capital inﬂows. They argued that FDI
and outsourcing by MNEs can raise relative demand for skilled labor not only in the home
(industrialized) country but also in the host (developing) one, increasing wage inequality in
both economies. They found that capital transfer by US ﬁrms can account for the bulk of the
increase in the skilled labor share of total wage bill that occurred in Mexico in the late 1980s
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). Despite a growing empirical literature investigating the possible
determinants of wage inequality in LDCs, the results are mixed and the sources of this pattern
1For a survey on the existing theoretical and empirical literature on international outsourcing, see Feenstra
and Hanson (2001).
2There are only few empirical studies on this issue and their results show no systematic correlation between
raising wage inequality and either outward or inward FDI in developed countries. See Slaughter (2000) and
Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) on US, and Head and Ries (2002) on Japan.
3remain a puzzle.3
During the process of transformation from planned to market economies, also Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have experienced a substantial increase of inequality in
labor earnings. The CEECs are, in some sense, in the middle between developed and developing
countries. While relatively well endowed of human capital, as a result of the large access to
education of the centralized regimes, these countries nonetheless suﬀer a mismatching between
their current institutional, economic and political system and the requirements posed by a well
functioning market economy. It is therefore important to investigate whether the huge inﬂow of
foreign capital has played a role by changing the relative labor demand as suggested for developed
and developing countries, or other factors, such as institutional changes and increasing trade
integration with the EU countries, might help to explain recent labor market outcomes. To
answer this question, we estimate the impact of increasing inﬂow of FDI on wage inequality and
on the composition of labor demand between skilled and unskilled workers in Poland, Hungary
a n dt h eC z e c hR e p u b l i c .
Our main ﬁnding is the following. While in Hungary and the Czech Republic FDI exerts
a positive direct impact on the skill-premium, in none of the countries considered FDI has
worsened wage inequality by favoring labor demand shifts. In the case of Poland it is diﬃcult
to trace any speciﬁc role at all for FDI, which may be due to the slower pace of the transition to
a market economy that characterizes this country. Thus, the emerging picture is one in which
multinational ﬁrms play an active role in the transition-induced restructuring process, but mainly
by favoring workers mobility across sectors and occupations and bringing wage dispersion closer
3Most of the empirical studies on the relationship between international integration and wage inequality in
LDCs has analyzed the eﬀects of trade liberalization episodes. For a recent survey, see Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2004).
4to the actual skill distribution, rather than inﬂuencing the labor demand composition.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the dataset used in the
empirical analysis and the descriptive evidence on the three accession countries under analysis.
Section 3 sets up the empirical model. Estimation and empirical results are shown and discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data description and stylized facts
Our analysis focuses on the manufacturing sector of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Repub-
lic and aims at investigating whether and to what extent the huge inﬂow of FDI received by
these countries in the last decade might have contributed to the raising wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers which has been experienced since the beginning of the transition
process. At this purpose, lacking a more detailed industrial breakdown on inward FDI, we use
an industry-year panel consisting of observations on six sectors for the period 1993-2000. To
proxy MNEs penetration, we use the inward FDI position (stocks), primarily relying upon the
OECD “International Direct Investment Statistics” database. Earning inequality and composi-
tion of labor demand are proxied by the skilled labor shares of total wage-bill and employment,
respectively. We follow the usual skill approximation and accordingly deﬁne non-manual and
manual employees as skilled and unskilled workers, gathering data on employment and wages
for the two categories from each country’s statistical yearbooks. To take into account other
possible and often debated explanations for the rise in wage inequality, our database includes
also the following variables: business enterprise expenditure on R&D, proxing the inﬂuence of
technical progress; exports and imports of ﬁnal goods, accounting for the eﬀects of international
5trade on relative factor prices; gross value added, controlling for industry-scale eﬀects. All data
are converted in constant 1995 US$ and aggregated according to the FDI classiﬁcation. For a
detailed description of the database, see the Appendix.
Some stylized facts on these data are as follows. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
have experienced rapid increases in the wage diﬀerential during the 1990s: between 1993 and
2001, the relative wage of skilled workers has increased from 1.40 to 1.81 in the Czech Republic
and from 1.94 to 2.29 in Hungary, whereas it has risen from 1.44 to 1.80 in Poland between 1994
and 2001. At the same time, relative employment of skilled workers — as proxied by the ratio
between the number of non-manual and manual employees - has shown a moderate decline in the
case of Hungary and the Czech Republic (from 0.29 to 0.25 and from 0.38 to 0.33, respectively);
in Poland, instead, it has slightly increased since 1994 (0.28) and today amounts to 0.31 (Figure
1). The skilled labor shares of total manufacturing wage bill and of total employment have
moved consistently with these patterns.4 These developments are somewhat conﬂicting with
the evidence from other developed and developing countries, where higher wage inequality has
been generally caused by a growing demand for skills. At a ﬁrst glance, this suggests that
the opening of the wage gap might not have been induced —at least in Hungary and in the
Czech Republic- by any of the several forces which usually worsen wage disparities by raising
the relative demand for skilled labor. An additional piece of empirical evidence may provide
useful insights. Decomposing the changes in the skilled labor shares of total employment and
of total wage bill, Crinò (2004) ﬁnds that they are mostly due to within-industry rather than
4Looking at the dynamics of relative wage and employment at an industry level, one common feature for the
three countries emerges: the highest increase in earning inequality has been experienced in the food and chemical
industries. The evolution of the measures of wage and employment disparities appears much more diﬀerentiated
in the remaining sectors (Crinò, 2004).
6beetwen-industries variations. Therefore, whatever the causes of wage inequality, they seem to
act through changes in the proportion of non-manual workers within each industry, rather than
through the reallocation of the workforce towards industries with diﬀerent skill-intensity. This
is in line with ﬁndings from previous empirical analysis on diﬀerent DCs and LDCs countries
(Table 1).
Over the same period, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have received the largest
FDI inﬂow in Central and Eastern Europe; along with Slovakia and the Russian Federation, they
account today for 3/4 of the region’s inﬂows. In percentage of GDP, FDI stocks have sharply
increased in the last decade raising from values below 4% in 1990 to more than 40% in Hungary
and in the Czech Republic and than 20% in Poland in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2002). Consistently, FDI
stocks have markedly increased also in the manufacturing sector, which accounted for nearly half
of all inward stock, and some interesting regularities emerged in terms of sectoral distribution.
At the beginning of the transition process, foreign capital was concentrated primarily in the food
sector (accounting for more than 35% of total manufacturing FDI stock), and, to a lesser extent,
in textile and wood activities (Poland and Hungary), non-metallic products (Czech Republic),
and chemical products (Poland and Hungary). During the 1990s, with the general huge increase
of FDI inﬂows, foreign investors have been progressively redirecting their investments towards
more capital and skill-intensive industries. Nowadays, more than 50% of total manufacturing
FDI stock is concentrated in three industries: chemicals, metal and mechanical products, trans-
port equipment. In Hungary and Poland, the food industry still accounts for a share around
30%.5
FDI is just one expression of the rapid process of international integration which the three
5For a more detailed industry-level analysis, see Crinò (2004).
7countries have been involved in after the fall of the communist regime in 1989. Such a process,
in fact, has also resulted in a rapid increase and in a marked reorientation of trade ﬂows towards
new partners, especially the more advanced EU countries.6 Likewise, real exports and imports
have almost doubled in manufacturing and their industrial composition has changed. Starting
with a trade pattern typical of less developed coun t r i e s ,w i t hh i g hs h a r e so fe x p o r t si nt e x t i l e s ,
food (especially Hungary), and metallurgical industries (Czech Republic and Poland), the three
countries have experienced important changes in their comparative advantages. Progressively,
the pattern of specialization has shifted towards skilled labor intensive and capital intensive
sectors. The contribution to total manufacturing exports of the machinery, computers and
communications and of the transport equipment industries has increased dramatically, reaching
a share of more than 40% in Hungary and the Czech Republic (only 33% in Poland). Together
with these developments in inter-industry specialization, a general increase in the relevance of
intra-industry trade has occurred, particularly in trade relations with the EU. This is the result,
on one hand, of the growing importance of global production networks and the role of MNEs
in integrating these countries into the international division of labor, and on the other hand, of
the improvements obtained in intra-branch product quality (Landesmann and Stehrer, 2002).
In conclusion, since the transition process started in 1989, the three countries have remark-
ably opened up to international integration, allowing higher penetration by foreign investors and
intensifying their participation in trade ﬂows. At the same time, earning inequality in manufac-
turing has worsened and skilled labor has become more rewarded. The contemporary occurrence
of these phenomena, however, does not necessarily imply a causal relationship between them.
6The EU-15 accounts today for about 70% of total exports and imports, while no more than 50% of total
ﬂows were directed towards this area in 1990.
8The remaining part of the paper, therefore, investigates the existence of such a causal link, by
making use of nonparametric and parametric approaches.
3. The empirical model
Empirical studies in international trade on the determinants of skill upgrading and skill pre-
mium typically maintain eﬃcient allocation of resources within industries, either explicitly or
implicitly. We put ourselves into this tradition, and for our empirical analysis we maintain cost
minimization within sectors for given stock of capital. In more detail, we assume the existence
of a representative ﬁrm for a given industry, which minimizes the cost of skilled and unskilled
labor to produce a given amount of output, treating capital as ﬁxed over the relevant sample
period. This optimization problem for the ﬁrm yields the following variable cost function
C (ws,wu,Y,K)= m i n
Ns,Nu [wsNs + wuNu : Y = F (Ns,Nu,K)] (3.1)
where Y denotes output; K denotes capital; Ns and Nu denote the number of skilled and
unskilled workers; and ws and wu denote wages for skilled and unskilled workers.
One clear advantage of cost minimization is the possibility of testing structural characteristics
of interest, such as returns to scale and elasticities of substitution, from estimated demand or
share equations. It is, however, questionable that in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
instantaneous adjustments of inputs to relative price variations occurred without exceptions of
sectors and years, especially if one thinks of the dramatic structural changes that these countries
have experienced over the period considered. For this reason, before estimating parametric share
equations based on cost minimization, we ﬁrst test cost minimizing behavior by direct inspection
9of data. This assumption, indeed, can be tested nonparametrically by verifying the inequalities
implied by the Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization (WACM) (see Varian, 1984) on sector data:








r , ∀t,r =1 ,...,T (3.2)
where t =1 ,...,T indicates the year, so that subscription denotes an observation for the cor-
responding variable. Given the limits of our data, some modiﬁcations to (3.2) are however
necessary. Since we do not observe the capital stock, we assume that it remains ﬁxed over any
two contiguous years. In addition, we allow for non-regressive technical progress by restricting
comparisons of the current cost levels to the past year only, so that the inequalities in (3.2)
modiﬁes as follows
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The evidence drawn from the nonparametric analysis will be used for searching adequate econo-
metric speciﬁcations and estimators for the cost function. The baseline parametric model is
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10By applying Shephard Lemma and exploiting the homogeneity and adding-up restrictions for
the translog, we can derive the following share equation for skilled labor:





+ βKslnK + βYslnY (3.5)
where WShs is the skilled-labor share of total industry wage-bill. Modiﬁcations of equation
(3.5) will be estimated and tested using a battery of estimators on the pooled data for the three
countries, but also on subsets of data.
4. Results
The ﬁrst part of this section contains results for the nonparametric analysis. The rest of the
section is devoted to parametric results.
4.1. Nonparametric analysis
From the analysis of WACM as in (3.3) we ﬁnd the following (Table 2). For the Czech Republic
there are 15% rejections overall; 7% rejections greater than 10%; and 4% rejections greater
than 20%. There is only one critical year, 1997, with signiﬁcant rejections (>5%) in sectors
Wood, paper and publishing, and Basic metals and metal products. For Hungary there are
28% rejections; with 17% rejections greater than 5%; and 11% rejections greater than 20%.
Critical years are 1999 and 2001, with signiﬁcant rejections in sectors Food; Chemicals; Metal
and mechanical products; and Transport equipment. Poland is the country that seems the
most distant from sectoral cost minimization, with 45% rejections of WACM. 36% rejections are
greater than 10% of which 27% are greater than 20%. Violations, however, are concentrated in
111995 and 1996, and are particularly signiﬁcant in sectors Food; Textiles; Chemicals; Metal and
mechanical products.
To sum up, for no country we are able to observe systematic violations of WACM spread over
all sectors and years. Instead, we do observe for all countries a few critical years and sectors,
for which deviations from cost minimizing behavior emerge as particularly severe. We shall
take these ﬁndings into account for parametric estimation in the next section, when relaxing
somewhat the homogeneity of the speciﬁcation over time.
4.2. Parametric analysis
By simply adding extra regressors, equation (3.5) can be expanded to take into account the
eﬀects of several variables on wage inequality. First of all, we use inward-FDI stocks, (FDI),
as measure of multinational enterprises penetration. Moreover, in order to take into account
the other variables that according to the existing literature might exert eﬀects on the wage gap
between skilled and unskilled workers (Berman et al., 1994; Autor et al., 1998; Machin and
Van Reenen, 1998; Egger and Stehrer, 2003) we control also for the inﬂuence of international
integration by using exports and imports of ﬁnal good, (X)a n d( M), and proxy technological
change with the total business enterprise expenditure on R&D, (R&D). Industry output, Y ,
is measured by gross value added, (VA ). A set of year-dummies, (Ye a r), enters the regression
to capture time-speciﬁc, industry-invariant shocks which are likely to be important in these
countries because of the deep institutional changes brought about by transition. Since there are
no observations available on the capital stock at an industry level, we identify our share equation
by assuming that all variations of capital stock correlated with the included explanatory variables
are captured by sector- and time-dummies. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that neither FDI
12nor any of the other variables exert an immediate impact on relative employment and wages;
all regressors, therefore, enter the regression lagged once. This gives us the following baseline
estimating share equation:








+ β1 ln(FDI)i,c,t−1 + β2 ln(X)i,c,t−1 + (4.1)
+β3 ln(M)i,c,t−1 + β4 ln(VA )i,c,t−1 + β5 ln(R&D)i,c,t−1 + γ(Ye a r)t + εi,c,t
where ε is an idiosyncratic error term and α is an industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect; i =1 ,...,6
indexes the manufacturing industries, t = 1993,...2000 is the time span of our panel7 and
c = PO,HU,CR are the three countries considered; the subscript of the coeﬃcient on the log-
relative wage of the skilled, β
w
c , indicates that the corresponding variable is interacted with the
country-dummies. Constant returns to scale in production imply β4 = −(β1 + β2 + β3 + β5).
4.2.1. Fixed-eﬀect estimation
Several studies on the skill upgrading (Machin and Van Reenen, 1998; Blonigen and Slaughter,
2001; Pavcnik, 2003) have noted that the log-relative wage of the skilled is likely to be endogenous
in a share equation. In fact, as suggested in Berman et al. (1994), although part of the variation
in the relative wage can be due to diﬀerences in the skill-mix across industries, some of it is
likely to be caused by the skill upgrading occurring within industries. To avoid this problem,
the relative wage is usually excluded from the regression and its eﬀect is taken into account by
using time- or country-dummies. Following this line of reasoning, we ﬁr s to m i ts u c hv a r i a b l ea n d
7In the case of Poland, the time span is 1994-2000.
13estimate equation (4.1) by a ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator allowing for unobserved heterogeneity across
industries; results are presented in Table 3. To deal with the small cross-sectional dimension
of our panel, we begin pooling the three countries together and accommodating the inﬂuence
of country-speciﬁc characteristics by diversifying the industry ﬁxed eﬀects across countries; as
a result, 138 observations become available (column 1).8 The ﬁxed eﬀects are always highly
signiﬁcant. No evidence does emerge of an impact of FDI on the skilled-labor share of total
wage-bill; although positive, the coeﬃcient on FDI is very small and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. On the other hand, our export measure is highly signiﬁcant and its negative coeﬃcient
suggests that trade integration might contribute to a reduction in the relative demand for skilled
labor. Jointly signiﬁcance of time dummies, instead, reveals that industry-wise year-speciﬁc
changes -implied by the ongoing transition process- have hit the manufacturing sector of the
three countries and exerted important eﬀects on the relative demand for skilled labor. Such
eﬀects, of course, are likely to diﬀer across the three countries; it is, indeed, realistic to think
of such year-speciﬁcs h o c k sa sa ﬀecting the relative demand of skilled labor diﬀerently from one
country to the other, because of diﬀerences in the pace and speed of the transition to a market
economy. To allow for country speciﬁcities, we reestimate equation (4.1), interacting the time-
dummies with the country-dummies (column 2). The results seem very robust. In particular,
no relationship emerges between foreign presence and the relative demand for skilled labor: not
only the coeﬃcient on FDI is still not signiﬁcant, but it switches sign and becomes negative as
the speciﬁcation is expanded by including the interacted time-dummies. As expected, the latter
are highly signiﬁcant and support the intuition about strong heterogeneity in the year-speciﬁc
8More speciﬁcally, our panel consists of 6 manufacturing industries for 8 years (1993-2000) in the cases of
Hungary and the Czech Republic, and 6 industries for 7 years (1994-2000) in the case of Poland.
14shocks across the three economies.
4.2.2. Instrumental Variable estimation on the pooled sample
So far, we have dealt with the log-relative wage endogeneity by simply omitting such vari-
able from the regression. Microeconomic theory, however, implies that cost minimizing relative
factor-demands are functions of relative prices and would therefore suggests to keep into explicit
consideration the log-relative wage of the skilled when estimating a share equation like (4.1).
This task, however, requires to change estimation method in order to tackle the endogeneity
problem. Finding valid instruments for relative prices would allow to include them explicitly in
the speciﬁcation dealing at the same time with the endogeneity. We, therefore, estimate again
equation (4.1) with an instrumental variable (IV) estimator; we choose as instruments for the
country-speciﬁc relative skilled wages their second and third lags. In this setup, moreover, it
is worth nothing that an endogeneity problem might indeed aﬀect not only relative prices but
also the FDI variable. In fact, there might be, ﬁrst of all, some common forces jointly deter-
mining both the skilled-labor share of total wage-bill and the foreign penetration in a country;
furthermore, as noted in Pavcnik (2003), it might well be the case that in some industries it
is foreign penetration to be incentivated by an already high skill-intensity, rather than the op-
posite. For this reason we instrument also our FDI variable by using its own ﬁrst three lags
as well as the ﬁrst three lags of a country-speciﬁc FDI measure, obtained by interacting FDI
with the country-dummies9. Results are reported in Table 4. In each speciﬁcation, the Sargan’s
test does not reject the null hypothesis of instruments validity at any conventional signiﬁcance
9B yt h es a m et o k e n ,e x p o r t sa n di m p o r t sm i g h tb ee n d o g e n o u st o o . W eh a v ei n s t r u m e n t e dt h e mu s i n ga
similar instrument set. The results, however, do not change at all when doing this. All these regressions are
available from the authors upon request.
15level; the constant returns to scale hypothesis is instead rejected. When relative wages enter
t h er e g r e s s i o n ,t i m ed u m m i e sl o o s et h e i rs i g n i ﬁcance (column 1); this holds true also when they
are interacted with the country-dummies (column 2). This suggests that the previously found
time-eﬀects on the relative skilled-labor demand act through changes in the relative price of
the skilled-labor input. Indeed, after excluding the time-dummies from the set of regressors10,
relative wages become highly signiﬁcant (column 3). Given their positive sign, the matrix of
estimated coeﬃcients on relative prices is not negative semideﬁnite. This not withstanding, the
matrix of substitution elasticities may be negative semideﬁnite, as required by cost minimiza-
tion. For this to be true a necessary condition is that the elements on the main diagonal must







< 0 for c = PO,HU,CR; since this formula assumes
no optimization error, it has to be computed using ﬁtted, rather than actual, average shares of
skilled labor in total costs (Hayashi, 2000). As evident, reported shares imply that the regularity
condition is satisﬁed for both Hungary and the Czech Republic but not for Poland. Turning to
the other variables, these regressions further strenghten the results from the ﬁxed-eﬀect estima-
tion: FDI does not exert any signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the relative demand for skilled labor and,
indeed, estimates for the associated coeﬃcients are rather small and actually characterized by
the negative sign; on the contrary, further evidence is provided for the inﬂuence of exports as
acting in favor of the unskilled and against the skilled.
Hence, regardless of the huge and contemporary increase in foreign penetration and in wage
inequality, our results do not support the idea of a positive causal relationship between the
two phenomena. FDI does not seem to have aﬀected relative labor demand for the skilled
and thus cannot be taken as responsible for the deepening in the wage gap through outward
10Dummies are still included, however, in the instruments matrix.
16shifts of the relative demand schedule. We have indeed showed that relative employment of
the skilled has actually fallen during the last decade, at least in Hungary and in the Czech
Republic; increasing export ﬂows seem to be responsible for some part of this reduction and
accordingly to have contributed to containing the documented worsening in wage inequality.
Nevertheless, the past socialist experience of these three countries suggests that the rising in
earning diﬀerentials may have occurred even lacking a biased labor demand shift in favor of the
skilled. To be more precise, all formerly centrally planned economies were certainly well endowed
of human capital, as evident from comparisons with other economies either at the same or at
higher level of development; at the same time, they showed a very compressed wage structure
unable to reﬂect the actual skill distribution. In these respects, the transition to the market has
brought about two not negligible changes. On the one hand, wage determination has gained
ﬂexibility and approached schemes closer to those typical of a market economy; as a result, the
earning structure has changed and progressively ﬁtted much better the actual skill distribution.
A number of studies documents, indeed, signiﬁcant rises in the returns to education during the
1990s as compared to the period under the communist regime.11 As a result, wage inequality
has been physiologically worsened by the transition process. On the other hand, skills available
before the transition could not be easily adapted and transferred in the developing market
economy, because they were too specialized and speciﬁcf o rag i v e nﬁrm or production process
(Boeri, 2000; Campos and Coricelli, 2002; Commander and Kollo, 2004; Svejnar, 1999); this has
caused, on one side, a strong reduction in secondary schools and vocational-school enrollment
rates (Boeri, 2000; Campos and Coricelli, 2002) and, on the other side, increasing unemployment
11See Boeri and Terrell (2002), Fleisher et al. (2004), and Svejnar (1999), for a comprehensive review of
relevant studies.
17for workers with vocational education (Boeri and Terrell, 2002; Flanagan, 1998). These two
transition-induced labor market changes explain the documented peculiar pattern of relative
employment and wages in Hungary and in the Czech Republic: wage inequality increased as
a consequence of the departure from the highly compressed wage structure in place under the
socialist regime and skilled labor became progressively more rewarded. At the same time, the
needs of the newborn market economy required to adopt eﬃciency criteria in resource allocation
and to rationalize the use of inputs in production, included the overspecialized pre-transition
skills which became, as a result, needless and unadaptable in the new private sector. Among
the three countries, Hungary and the Czech Republic were interested from these changes sooner
than Poland, which lagged behind in the microeconomic and industrial restructuring in spite
of the rapid completion of the macroeconomic aspects of transition. The role played by foreign
ﬁrms in the restructuring process and their contribution to the above changes is undeniable if we
consider that multinationals corporations have penetrated these economies by mainly exploiting
the opportunities opened up by the ongoing privatization process, so helping creating a new
private sector and exposing it to stronger competitive pressures. Through this channel, FDI
might have worsened wage inequality by simply contributing to change the wage determination
and to increase the skill-premium with respect to the pre-transition period. This intuition is
indeed supported by the results reported in column 4 of Table 4, where we use the skill-premium
-as proxied by the ratio between skilled and unskilled wages- as dependent variable, rather than
the share of skilled labor in total wage-bill: FDI is highly signiﬁcant and positively signed; at
the same time, the joint signiﬁcance of time-dummies reveals that institutional changes and
the above mentioned features of the transition process have exerted a crucial impact on the
dynamics of the wage premium in each country during the 1990s.
184.2.3. Instrumental Variable estimation on the country-speciﬁc subsamples
Up to now, we have jointly analyzed the three economies. Although this allows to beneﬁtf r o m
more degrees of freedom, it might also distort the results for two reasons. First, the stylized
facts on the labor market have shown a very diﬀerent behavior of the relative employment in
Hungary and in the Czech Republic, on the one hand, and in Poland, on the other. Second,
both the nonparametric and the parametric analysis has questioned the validity of a cost min-
imization setting for analyzing the dynamics of wage inequality in Poland. In order to check
the robustness of our results, we therefore proceed by repeating the instrumental variable es-
timation on two subsamples: the ﬁrst includes Hungary and the Czech Republic, whereas the
second consists of observations for Poland only. We begin presenting estimates from the ﬁrst
subsample. As far as the share equations are concerned, the ﬁrst three columns of Table 5 show
that the same conclusions drawn before appl yt ot h ec a s eo fH u n g a r ya n dt h eC z e c hR e p u b -
lic: the constant returns to scale hypothesis is rejected; time dummies (whether interacted or
not with country-dummies) are not jointly signiﬁcant and excluding them from the regression
enhance signiﬁcance in the country-speciﬁc wage variable; regularity conditions for the matrix
of substitution elasticities are satisﬁed at reported average ﬁtted shares. FDI does not seem to
exert any signiﬁcant impact on wage inequality through upward shifts in the relative demand
for skilled workers and indeed, signiﬁcance aside, its associated coeﬃcient is again negative in all
speciﬁcations. Still, FDI cannot be denied at all an inﬂuence on the increased wage inequality
occurred in the two countries in the 1990s; as above, in fact, estimating a wage equation yields a
signiﬁcant and positive impact of foreign presence on the skill-premium as column 4 of Table 5
shows; we attribute such an impact to the contribution of FDI to the transition process towards
19the market economy.
The above results, although robust for Hungary and the Czech Republic, do not seem to
be conﬁrmed in the case of Poland. Before presenting them, one estimation issue should be
emphasized and taken into account from now on.N a m e l y , t h e I V e s t i m ator has asympthotic
properties which require a large number of observations; when concentrating on the Poland case,
the dimension of our panel dramatically shrinks and we are left with only 42 observations; with
this caveat in mind, however, we still believe it is worth trying to study this country separately
for the reasons illustrated before. And indeed, interesting insights do emerge from this analysis.
First of all, share equation estimates reported in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 6, yields very
diﬀerent results from those related to the other two countries: apart from the relative wage,
whose signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient in the speciﬁcation without time-dummies violates the
regularity conditions for the substitution elasticity matrix, no other variable is signiﬁcantly able
to explain the skilled-labor share of total wage-bill. Consistently with what we have seen for the
other two countries, the eﬀects of institutional changes on the wage premium do emerge from
the wage equation reported in the third column of Table 6, as the time-dummies are jointly
signiﬁc a n t ;i fa n y ,h o w e v e r ,t h ee ﬀect of FDI on relative wages seems to have been negative and
this would sharply conﬂict with what has happened in the other two cases. Before drawing any
conclusion from these results, one point should be stressed. The cost minimization setup which
we are working in seems to be inadequate to describe the Polish case; on the one hand, in fact, the
nonparametric analysis has revealed that the worst violations of the WACM have occurred in this
country; on the other hand, the regularity conditions for the substitution elasticity matrix were
never satisﬁed in any of the reported speciﬁcations. For these reasons, we now try to exploit the
ﬁndings from the nonparametric analysis in our econometric estimation; namely, we eliminate
20from the sample those years which have proved to be the most problematic in the light of the
cost minimization model: 1995 and 1996. Results are shown in the last two columns of Table 6.
Our intuition is conﬁrmed; the coeﬃcient on the log-relative wage in the share equation, in fact,
is now insigniﬁcant, which is enough to guarantee a negative semideﬁnite Hessian of the cost
function; although positively signed, the FDI coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
suggesting once again that foreign presence is not responsible for the rise in wage inequality
either in Poland, at least through its eﬀects on the relative demand for skilled labor; export
activity, instead, acts signiﬁcantly on the relative labor demand in favor of the unskilled portion
of the workforce; institutional changes and the rising speed of ﬁrm restructuring, ﬁnally, play
as i g n i ﬁcant role in Poland, diﬀerently from what we have learned for the other two countries.
This last result has to be attributed to the slower pace which has characterized Poland in the
completion of the microeconomic aspects of transition and which has implied important renewals
and restructuring in the manufacturing sector of the country also during the last decade. Finally,
as opposed to the other two countries, the FDI now does not seem to exert a signiﬁcant impact
on relative wage either, which conﬁrms the speciﬁcity of this country.
5. Conclusion
This paper investigates whether FDI penetration has contributed to the raise in wage inequal-
ity and to the change in the skill composition of labor demand in three EU accession coun-
tries - Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - during the 1990s. Using nonparametric and
parametric approaches our results suggest that, although FDI has not worsened wage inequal-
ity by favoring labor demand shifts in the three countries, it has contributed to raising the
21skill-premium through the active role played by multinational ﬁrms in the transition-induced
restructuring process in Hungary and the Czech Republic. In more detail, for these two coun-
tries the transition and privatization process, hand in hand with an increasing international
integration, has pushed the labor market from a compressed and rigid wage structure towards
forms of wage determination more typical of a decentralized market economy. Overall, the FDI
penetration more than aﬀecting production technology and relative labor demand seems to have
favored workers mobility across sectors and occupations and brought wage dispersion closer to
the actual skill distribution. For Poland, while the scarce eﬀect of FDI on the relative skilled
labor demand is conﬁrmed, evidence does not support a signiﬁcant direct eﬀect of FDI on the
skill-premium, so that it is diﬃcult for us to carry over the argument advanced for Hungary
and the Czech Republic into this case. The impossibility to tell a common story for the three
countries can be explained by the slower pace of the transition process taking place in Poland.
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22DATA APPENDIX
Data on Foreign Direct Investment stocks in Poland and Hungary come from the OECD
“International Direct Investment Statistics” (http://www.sourceoecd.org) and are classiﬁed in
six ISIC Rev.3 industries. Unfortunately, the OECD data oﬀer a suﬃciently long time series only
for Poland (1994-2000); for Hungary, instead, they cover only the period 1993-1998. In order to
obtain a longer time series (1993-2000), therefore, we merge them with the data provided for more
recent years by the UNCTAD “World Investment Directory” (http://www.unctad.org), whose
observations for 1997 and 1998 fully coincide with the OECD ones. For the Czech Republic,
we rely upon the “Balance of Payments Statistics” of the Czech National Bank (www.cnb.cz),
which provide data on FDI inﬂows in eight manufacturing industries for the period 1993-2001.12
FDI stocks have been obtained as cumulative inﬂows.
Data on exports, imports, and gross value added are collected from the OECD “Stan
Database for Industrial Analysis”.13 Data on total business expenditure on R&D come from
the OECD “Basic Science and Technology Statistics” (http://www.sourceoecd.org). All data
are based on the ISIC Rev.3 classiﬁcation.
Finally, we refer to each country’s Statistical Yearbook for information on wages and employ-
ment of the manual and non-manual workers. Such data are classiﬁed according to NACE Rev.
2 in fourteen 2-digit manufacturing industries and are available for the period 1993-2001. Some
clariﬁcation is needed about the Czech labor market data. Statistical yearbooks for this country,
do not report information on employment and wages for the non-manual workers. We therefore
12For the parametric analysis, the eight Czech manufacturing industries have been converted in the six ISIC
Rev.3 industries.
13Observations on Polish gross value added in 2000 are gathered from the OECD “Structural Statistics for In-
dustry and Services” (2003) (http://www.sourceoecd.org), whereas information on the corresponding Hungarian
variable in 2001 comes from the same country’s Statistical Yearbook.
23estimate them following Egger and Stehrer (2003).14 In particular, we ﬁrst compute the number
of non-manual employees as diﬀerence between total and manual employment; the non-manual














i , where the superscripts index skilled (non-
manual) and unskilled (manual) workers and the subscript the manufacturing industries, N is
the number of employees and w the average wage.
All data are converted in constant 1995 US$. Deﬂation is carried out by using a common
deﬂator across industries. It comes from EUROSTAT, NewCronos Database15 and is deﬁned
as the ratio between GDP at current prices and GDP at constant prices.
As mentioned, the original data are classiﬁed according to very diﬀerent industrial break-
downs; this requires us to make them consistent with the six-industry FDI classiﬁcation, which
clearly represents the most stringent constraint because of the limited industrial disaggregation.
To recover the FDI classiﬁcation, we carry out a two-step procedure. First, we convert the
industries from ISIC Rev. 3 to NACE Rev. 2 (2-digit) classiﬁcation according to the correspon-
dence table provided by EUROSTAT (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat), and then we
aggregate the observations in the six ISIC Rev. 3 industries. The aggregation procedure for the
wage variables needs to be explicitly explained; starting with data on manual and non-manual
employment and wages at the NACE 2-digit level, we calculate the average wage of the two


















,w h e r ej = s,u
refers to the two skill-categories and i =1 ,...,I indexes the NACE 2-digit sectors belonging












i are, respectively, the total wage-bill and
employment of the manual and non-manual workers in A.
14For the period 1993-1999, the data we use coincide with those in Egger and Stehrer (2003). We are grateful
to R. Stehrer for the provision with data.
15On line at the following link: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat.
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Source: National Statistical Yearbooks (various years) 
*Skill ratio: non-manual employment relative to manual employment  
  Wage ratio: non-manual workers wage relative to manual workers wage 
 
 
Table 1 – Decomposition of the Change in the Skilled Labor Shares of Total Employment and 
                 Total Wage-bill (% values)* 
                      
  Employment    Wage-bill 
  Between Within  Total  Between Within  Total 
          
Poland  -0,065 1,564  1,49    -3,37  8,28  4,91 
(1994-2001)        
         
Hungary  -0,74 -1,50 -2,24    -0,47 1,51  1,04 
(1993-2001)        
         
Czech Republic  -0,80  -2,67  -3,47    0,60 2,40 3,00 
(1993-2001)                   
Source:  Crinò (2004), Table 2. 
 
* Following Berman et al. (1994), the overall change in the skilled labor shares of total wage-bill and employment has 
been decomposed in the two dimensions, between-industries  and within-industry, according to: 
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Si i S P WSh WSh P WSh for i =1, .. I, where  S WSh  is the skilled-labor share of total wage-bill 
(employment) in manufacturing,  Si WSh  is the skilled-labor share of wage-bill (employment) in industry i,  i P  is the 
share of industry i  in total manufacturing wage-bill (employment),  Si WSh  and  i P  are time averages of the 
corresponding variables. Table 2- Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization (WACM) 
 Czech Republic                                                 
                           Industrya  1  2  3    4  5    6    7  8 
 Year  WtNt c  WtNt-1   WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1 
2000-1999  1542651  1682887  1090976  1175858          1045279  1020248            
1999-1998      1079690  1147171  948527  985969  721025  744739      2487936 2604558 1777254 1994616    
1998-1997  1537031  1599166  1100584  1165324  908958  918490  690271  720628  923550  913226  2505474 2488950 1870924 1947469 577056  605442 
1997-1996          818015  594920  642923  638307      2262200 1990736 1726403 1597727    
1996-1995                          1367672 1466332 399305  413153 
1995-1994  830670  832852  803643  879901                         
1994-1993      768526  881243  412806  477068              1151548 1381624    
 Hungary                                     
                            Industryb 1  2  3    4  5    6   
 Year  WtNt c  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1 
2001-2000          7575796  11050533 7552098  7284693      5784446 3994686
2000-1999      10335328 11489357 10074123 10535012            
1999-1998  9449533  8721855      9123915  8765319  5543197  4347694         
1998-1997                  3693898  3779942    
1997-1996  6651200  7032789          3944778  4029894         
1996-1995  5890914  6252307  5720029  5959024  3271498  4134318  3262895  3509927  2447103  2500428    
1995-1994  5211009  5649160                     
1994-1993  4720831  5152114      3802098  4078387      1794434  2090508    
Poland                                     
                           Industryb  1  2  3    4  5    6   
 Year  WtNt c  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1  WtNt  WtNt-1 
2000-1999                         
1999-1998          504772  529304  499214  543055  389383  436036  346662  375514 
1998-1997  554018  538689              320777  337228     
1997-1996                      238314  244206 
1996-1995  379264  281507  434540  331889  276341  229397  297214  238819         
1995-1994                      145655  147824 
Source: our calculations based on data from National Statistical Yearbooks (various years) 
a Czech Republic: 1=Food and tobacco; 2=Textiles, wearing apparel and leather; 3=Wood, paper and publishing; 4=Refined petroleum and chemicals; 5=Non-metallic products; 
               6=Basic metals and metal products; 7=Machinery and equipment; 8=Other manufacturing. 
b Hungary and Poland: 1=Food products; 2=Total textile and wood activities; 3=Total petroleum, chemical, rubber, plastic products; 4=Total metal and mechanical products;  
                             5=Total machinery, computers, RTV, communications; 6=Total vehicles and other transport equipments. 










Table 3 – Fixed-Effect Estimation (Country*Sector Effects) 
Dependent Variable  WSh  WSh 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2) 
ln(FDI)_1  0.001  -0.001    
  (0.47)  (-0.85)    
ln(X)_1 -0.051***  -0.022**    
  (-4.75)  (-2.52)    
ln(M)_1  0.002  -0.024***     
  (0.20)  (-2.83)    
ln(VA) _1  0.012  -0.023* 
 (0.67)  (-1.74) 
ln(R&D) _1  0.003 0.001     
  (0.76)  (0.31)    
Year Dummies  YES***  NO 
Year*Country Dummies  NO  YES*** 
F-Test for joint significance of  
Year Dummies (p-value)  0.000 - 
F-Test for joint significance of  
Year*Country Dummies (p-value)  - 0.000 
No. of obs.  138  138 
F-Test for homogeneity of  
Country*Sector effects (p-value)  0.000 0.000 
R
2   0.42 0.71 
































 Table 4 – Fixed-Effect Instrumental Variable Estimation on the Pooled Sample  
    (Country*Sector Effects) 
Dependent Variables  WSh  u s w w /  
Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
ln(
u s w w / )PO_1  0.337***     0.119     0.375***     - 
  (4.43)     (1.04)  (10.01)      
ln(
u s w w / )CR_1  0.128     0.222     0.178***  - 
  (1.24)     (1.31)     (3.04)      
ln(
u s w w / )HU_1  0.094     0.169     0.189***      - 
  (0.65)     (1.31)     (3.22)      
ln(FDI)_1  -0.005     -0.004     -0.005      0.034***     
  (-1.18)     (-0.99)     (-1.09)     (3.98) 
ln(X)_1  -0.025**     -0.012  -0.021**     -0.065***    
  (-2.18)     (-1.08)     (-2.45)  (-2.84)    
ln(M)_1  0.001    -0.016     0.004     -0.051* 
  (0.14)     (-1.46)     (0.39)     (-1.95)    
ln(VA) _1  -0.021     -0.034**     -0.026**     0.103***    
  (-1.41)     (-2.49)     (-2.11)     (3.02)    
ln(R&D) _1  -0.003     -0.002     -0.002     0.025** 
  (-0.61)     (-0.49)     (-0.58)     (2.31)    
Year Dummies  YES  NO  NO  YES*** 
Year*Country Dummies  NO  YES   NO  - 
F-Test for joint significance of 
Year dummies (p-value)  0.79 -    -  0.000 
F-Test for joint significance of 
Year*Country dummies (p-value)  - 0.09  -  - 
Sargan’s Test  (p-value)  0.72 0.21  0.80  - 
No. of obs.  138  138  138  138 
F-Test for homogeneity of  
Country*Sector effects (p-value)  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
R
2   0.64 0.74  0.63  0.77 
: 0 H CRS (p-value)  0.000 0.000  0.000  - 
WSh_Poland  
(fitted)  - -  0.502  - 
WSh_Czech Republic  
(fitted)  - -  0.316  - 
WSh_Hungary 
(fitted)  - -  0.297  - 







 Table 5 – Fixed-Effect Instrumental Variable Estimation: Hungary and the Czech Republic 
   (Country*Sector Effects) 
Dependent Variables  WSh  u s w w /  
Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
ln(
u s w w / )CR_1  0.214*  0.235     0.170***  - 
 (1.77)  (1.31)      (2.94)   
ln(
u s w w / )HU_1  0.241  0.148      0.186***  - 
 (1.43)  (1.13)      (3.19)   
ln(FDI)_1  -0.004  -0.003      -0.003  0.017**   
  (-1,04)  (-0.91)     (-0.82)  (2.17)    
ln(X)_1  -0.013  -0.005     -0.018* -0.066**     
  (-0.78)  (-0.37)     (-1.81)  (-2.35)    
ln(M)_1  -0.004  -0.022*     -0.003  -0.034    
  (-0.30)  (-1.66)     (-0.25)  (-1.08)    
ln(VA) _1  -0.031* -0.042**     -0.025** 0.075*    
  (-1.68)  (-2.44)     (-1.91)  (1.95)    
ln(R&D) _1  -0.003  -0.001     -0.001  0.021*    
  (-0.63)  (-0.18)     (-0.32)  (1.88)    
Year Dummies  YES  NO  NO  YES*** 
Year*Country Dummies  NO  YES  NO  - 
F-Test for joint significance of 
Year dummies (p-value)  0.82 -  -  0.000 
F-Test for joint significance of 
Year*Country dummies (p-value)  - 0.13  -  - 
Sargan’s Test  (p-value)  0.57 0.13  0.74  - 
No. of obs.  96  96  96  96 
F-Test for homogeneity of  
Country*Sector effects (p-value)  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
R
2   0.48 0.59  0.46  0.76 
: 0 H CRS (p-value)  0.000 0.000  0.000  - 
WSh_Czech Republic  
(fitted)  - -  0.386  - 
WSh_Hungary 
(fitted)  - -  0.368  - 
























Table 6 – Fixed-Effect Instrumental Variable Estimation: Poland 
   (Sector Effects) 
Dependent Variables  WSh  u s w w /  
WSh 
 (’95 and ’96 
excluded) 
u s w w /  
 (’95 and ’96 
excluded) 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
ln(
u s w w / )PO_1  0.246  0.306***  - 0.093  - 
 (1.15)  (5.03)    (0.75)   
ln(FDI)_1  0.014 0.014  -0.073**     0.022  -0.008    
  (0.56)  (1.30)  (-2.06)     (0.81)  (-0.10)    
ln(X)_1  -0.032  -0.027  0.032      -0.037***  -0.022    
 (-1.34)  (-1.47)  (0.82)  (-3.57)  (-0.73)     
ln(M)_1  -0.017  -0.010  0.046     0.013  0.012    
  (-0.59)  (-0.49)  (0.84)     (0.88)  (0.27)    
ln(VA) _1  -0.028 -0.034  0.281***     0.140*** 0.242**    
  (-0.38)  (-0.73)  (2.71)     (3.64)  (2.18)    
ln(R&D) _1  -0.022  -0.014  -0.007     -0.030***  -0.006    
  (-1.35)  (-0.99)  (-0.23)     (-3.72)  (-0.28)    
Year Dummies  YES  NO  YES*** YES*** YES* 
F-Test for joint significance of 
year dummies (p-value)  0.41 -  0.000  0.000  0.06 
Sargan’s Test  (p-value)  0.70  0.43 0.84 0.22  0.16 
No. of obs.  42  42  42  30  30 
F-Test for homogeneity of  
sector effects (p-value)  0.006  0.002 0.000 0.000  0.000 
R
2   0.85  0.80 0.93 0.97  0.95 
: 0 H CRS (p-value)  0.33 0.22  -  0.08  - 
WSh_Poland  
(fitted)  - 0.34  -  0.338  - 
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 